英検 1 級 Reading 出題率 急上昇中。 unipolar moment's end / weaponised interdependence / hybrid warfare を 8 スライドで。
“The rules-based liberal order, sustained by interlocking alliances and multilateral institutions, remains the indispensable architecture for global stability; revisionist powers must be deterred through credible collective resolve rather than appeased through territorial concession.”
相互に連動する同盟と多国間制度に支えられたルールベースのリベラル秩序は、 世界の安定にとって不可欠な建築物である。 修正主義勢力には領土的譲歩による宥和ではなく、 信頼性ある集合的決意による抑止で対処すべきである。
key vocab: rules-based / revisionist / multilateral / deterrence / appeasement
“The unipolar moment has irrevocably ended; American imperial overstretch, combined with the inexorable rise of plural civilisational centres, mandates a posture of strategic restraint and offshore balancing rather than universalist liberal hegemony.”
単極の時代は不可逆的に終わった。 米国の帝国的過剰拡張と複数文明中心の不可避な台頭は、 普遍主義的リベラル覇権ではなく戦略的抑制とオフショアバランシングを要請する。
反論への反論: 抑制論は宥和への滑り坂を生み、 修正主義国家のハイブリッド戦 — サイバー攻撃・選挙介入・情報戦 — を放置する。 (rebuttal: restraint enables hybrid encroachment)
“In an anarchic international system, great powers are condemned to compete for regional hegemony; rising states inevitably challenge incumbent orders, and the resulting security dilemma is structural, not pathological. Tragedy, not malice, drives great-power politics.”
無政府的国際システムにおいて、 大国は地域覇権を競うことを宿命づけられている。 台頭国は不可避に既存秩序に挑戦し、 結果として生じる安全保障のジレンマは病理ではなく構造的である。 大国政治を駆動するのは悪意ではなく悲劇である。 (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001)
I would argue that contemporary international politics has entered a phase best described as contested multipolarity, in which neither liberal hegemony nor offshore balancing alone provides adequate stability. China's purchasing-power-parity GDP overtook America's in 2017, and the BRICS+ bloc now accounts for some 35 % of world output: the material basis for unipolar enforcement has eroded. Concurrently, Farrell and Newman's concept of weaponised interdependence — exemplified by the 2022 expulsion of Russian banks from SWIFT — reveals that economic networks have themselves become coercive infrastructure, transforming globalisation into a geopolitical battleground. Mearsheimer's offensive realism rightly identifies the structural pressures driving great-power rivalry, yet his pessimism understates how dense institutional ties and nuclear deterrence dampen escalation. Critics of liberal internationalism warn of imperial overstretch; critics of restraint warn of hybrid encroachment via cyber operations and election interference. Both warnings have empirical weight. Therefore, a hybrid architecture — rules-based cooperation where feasible, calibrated balancing where necessary, and resilient supply-chain diversification throughout — best navigates the present transition.
Rebuttal 1: "Doesn't multipolarity invite war?" → Polarity alone is indeterminate; institutions and nuclear deterrence are stronger predictors (Jervis 2002).
Rebuttal 2: "Won't restraint embolden revisionists?" → Selective engagement with credible red lines is not appeasement (Posen 2014).
Rebuttal 3: "Is decoupling feasible?" → Targeted "small-yard, high-fence" decoupling is, but full decoupling is welfare-destroying.
Rebuttal 4: "What about hybrid warfare?" → Defensive resilience (cyber, media literacy, election security) is more effective than offensive escalation.
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